Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning.
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Le Breton, M. ; Weber, S. |
Institutions: | Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE) |
Subject: | economic models |
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