Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Weikard, Hans-Peter ; Dellink, Rob B. |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Klimaschutz | Umweltabkommen | Internationale Umweltpolitik | Koalition | Internationaler Transfer | Theorie | Stability of Coalitions | International Environmental Agreements | Partition Function Approach | Sharing Rules | Optimal Transfers | Renegotiations |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 2008,26 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 568788729 [GVK] hdl:10419/40659 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D62 - Externalities ; H41 - Public Goods ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism |
Source: |
-
Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations
Weikard, Hans-Peter, (2008)
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The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements
Weikard, Hans-Peter, (2004)
-
The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements
Weikard, Hans-Peter, (2004)
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Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
Weikard, Hans-Peter, (2008)
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Stability of international climate coalitions : a comparison of transfer schemes
Nagashima, Miyuki, (2009)
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Renegotiations in the greenhouse
Weikard, Hans-Peter, (2010)
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