Stochastic and Deterministic Menus in Common Agency games: A corrected version

In this note we argue that in Common Agency games, the restriction to deterministic menus is crutial.We give an simple example (complete information, no moral hazard) in which an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Piaser, Gwenaël
Institutions:	Luxembourg School of Finance, Faculté de droit, d'économie et de finance
Subject:	Delegation Principle \| Menus \| Lotteries

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	LSF Research Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005022222