Stochastic Bankruptcy Games

We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games. We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Other Persons:	Habis, Helga (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Transferierbarer Nutzen \| Transferable utility \| Insolvenz \| Insolvency \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Core

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 12, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1961141 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118346