Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information

We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players. <p> We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as well as the min-max value, exist, but they may differ. <p> We discuss extensions to the case of incomplete information on both sides.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2002-05-03
Authors:	VIEILLE, Nicolas ; ROSENBERG, Dinah ; SOLAN, Eilon
Institutions:	HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Subject:	stochastic games \| zero-sum games \| incomplete information \| value \| maxmin

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Les Cahiers de Recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Les Cahiers de Recherche - Groupe HEC Number 754 23 pages
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011510