Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Laux, Volker |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 106.2012, 3, p. 513-526
|
Subject: | Executive pay | Stock option vesting | Managerial myopia | CEO turnover | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Führungswechsel | Executive turnover | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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