Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Infinite Sets of Outcomes

We show that no game form with an infinite set of outcomes can bestraightforward and that no voting scheme with an infinite range can be non-manipulable.

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Year of publication:	2007-01-23
Authors:	Codognato, Giulio
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2007, 5, p. 1-4
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836214