Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is ‘close to optimal’. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Knapek, Stephan ; Wambach, Achim
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	combinatorial clock auction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 3983
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; L96 - Telecommunications
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010592131