Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts.
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kockesen, L. ; Ok, E. |
Institutions: | C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of Economics |
Subject: | STRATEGIC DELEGATION | UNOBSERVABLE CONTRACTS | FORWARD INDUCTION |
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