Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment

Traditional models of belief formation in repeated games assume adaptive players who do not take strategic interactions into account. We find that these approaches are limited in the sense that people think more strategically and realize that, in contrast with the classical view, their own actions are likely to influence their opponents' behaviour.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Hyndman, Kyle ; Terracol, Antoine ; Vaksmann, Jonathan
Institutions:	HAL

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00607238
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009207116