Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium paysoffs in termsof simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

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Year of publication:	1998-04-01
Authors:	GOSSNER, Olivier ; VIEILLE, Nicolas
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	Public value of information \| games with incomplete information \| bandit problems

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 1998023
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008285