Strategic Mismatches in Sequential Contracting: The Case of Professional Partnerships

Mismatches typically arise because of information problems in markets. This paper discusses the possibility of mismatching in partnerships focussing on strategic mismatches that cannot be explained by information problems. It is shown that due to market competition sometimes players can profit from voluntary mismatching.

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Year of publication:	1999-07
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	economies of scope \| free-rider effect \| loser's curse \| mismatch \| partnership

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Series:	Discussion Paper Serie A.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J44 - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968134