Strategic R&D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare.
The author considers a two-stage R&D then output or price duopoly game in which R&D spills over, so reducing the marginal cost of both the investing firm and its rival. The author compares the noncooperative regime to three collusive regimes--joint venture (collusion on R&D), price fixing (collusion at the price or output stage), and merger (collusion at both stages)--and evaluates under what circumstances a collusive regime improves welfare. If spillovers are sufficiently large, all three regimes are beneficial, although mergers are more likely and price-fixing less likely to produce specific benefits than are joint ventures. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Ziss, Steffen |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 42.1994, 4, p. 375-93
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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