Strategic vertical integration without foreclosure

We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. We show that vertical merger waves can be expected to stop by themselves before integration is complete. Consequently, vertical foreclosure plays no significant role in this paper that claims for a soft approach of vertical integration by antitrust authorities.

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Year of publication:	2003-06-04
Authors:	Avenel, Eric
Institutions:	Royal Economic Society - RES
Subject:	merger waves \| vertical integration \| vertical foreclosure

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Series:	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, 2003 Number 11
Classification:	L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005577105