Strategically Simple Implementation in the Bilateral Trade Problem

We show that there is no revelation principle for implementation in strategically simple mechanisms (Borgers and Li, ECMA 2019). In the bilateral trade problem, a strategic simple mechanisms may fail to satisfy local dictatorship and ex post individual rationality. There is, however, a revelation principle for the set of strategically simple mechanisms where no strategy is always weakly dominated

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Yang, Chih-Chun
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (7 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4372771 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014260540