Strategy-Proof Allocation of Indivisible Goods

Strategy-proof allocation of a finite number of indivisible goods among a finite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is serially dictatorial. If the indivisible goods are initially owned by the individuals, a mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto consistent if and only if it is the core mechanism

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Güter \| Goods \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 16, Iss. 4, August 1999 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184247