Strategy-proof allocation of objects revisited
Year of publication: |
September 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Andersson, Tommy ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar |
Publisher: |
Lund : Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University |
Subject: | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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