Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

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Year of publication:	1999-10-14
Authors:	Deb, Rajat ; Ohseto, Shinji
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 14.1999, 3, p. 685-689
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Social choice function Strategy-proofness \| Individual rationality \| Non-bossiness

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370813