Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies : A Note

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Deb, Rajat ; Ohseto, Shinji
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 14, Issue 3 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014179633