Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bahel, Eric ; Sprumont, Yves |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 126.2021, p. 94-99
|
Subject: | Decomposability | Monotonic additive preferences | Participatory budgeting | Strategy-proofness | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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