Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences : ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-waste fulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (2020B), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing rule among the rules satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

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Year of publication:	October 2020
Authors:	Sakai, Ryosuke ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publisher:	Osaka, Japan : The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Subject:	Multi-object allocation problem \| Strategy-proofness \| Ex-post revenue maximization \| Minimum price Walrasian rule \| Non-quasi-linear preference \| Equal treatment of equals \| Non-waste fulness \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Allgemeines Gleichgewicht \| General equilibrium \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice