Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-ﬁrm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al. (2017)) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is typically used in settings with discrete transfers

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Jagadeesan, Ravi
Other Persons:	Kominers, Scott Duke (contributor) ; Rheingans-Yoo, Ross (contributor)
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Matching \| Theorie \| Theory \| Transferierbarer Nutzen \| Transferable utility \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function

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