Strategy-proofness on bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object

We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategyproofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Hashimoto, Kazuhiko ; Nakayama, Yu
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	Strategy-proofness \| Ownership lower bound \| Equal right lower bound \| Impossibility result \| Finitely restricted preference domains

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 961
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	84861836X [GVK] hdl:10419/148189 [Handle] RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0961 [RePEc]
Classification:	d47 ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011564942