Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
Year of publication: |
January 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Athanasoglou, Stergios |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 95.2016, p. 156-167
|
Subject: | Aggregation rule | Strategyproofness | Efficiency | Kemeny distance | Aggregation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Effizienz | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Data-Envelopment-Analyse | Data envelopment analysis |
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