Strict Nash equilibria in large games with strict single crossing in types and actions

In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result.

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Year of publication:	2010-04
Authors:	Bilancini, Ennio ; Boncinelli, Leonardo
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi", Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia
Subject:	atomless \| single crossing \| strict Nash \| pure Nash \| monotone Nash

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Center for Economic Research (RECent).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	pages 7
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008470227