Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Fristrup, Peter ; Keiding, Hans |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 18.2001, 2, p. 213-226
|
Subject: | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Koalition | Coalition | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Theorie | Theory |
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