Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information

The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Aghion, Philippe ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Holden, Richard
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
Series:	Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper ; No. 2150
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1081588 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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