Subgroup independence conditions on preferences
The concept of <Emphasis Type="Bold">n-scale independence is introduced for a preference relation defined on <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${\mathbb{R}^{n}=\mathbb{R}^{n_{1}}\times \cdots \times \mathbb{R}^{n_{p}}}$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>. In addition to zero-independence and upper semicontinuity at zero, <Emphasis Type="Bold">n-scale independence allows us to characterizate linear oligarchies as well as to offer a (semi)continuous welfarist analogue of Wilson’s theorem. We also include a characterization of the class of continuous, <Emphasis Type="Bold">n-separable and <Emphasis Type="Bold">n-scale independent, p ≥ 3, social orderings in terms of what we call homogeneous oligarchies. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Candeal, Juan |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 39.2012, 4, p. 847-853
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Invariance axioms for preferences: applications to social choice theory
Candeal, Juan, (2013)
-
Social evaluation functionals: a gateway to continuity in social choice
Candeal, Juan, (2015)
-
Expected utility from additive utility on semigroups
Candeal, Juan, (2002)
- More ...