Subjective bonuses and target setting in budget-based incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aranda, Carmen ; Arellano, Javier ; Davila, Antonio |
Published in: |
Management accounting research. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1044-5005, ZDB-ID 1040541-0. - Vol. 43.2019, p. 45-60
|
Subject: | subjective bonuses | relative target difficulty | implicit contracts | goal commitment | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Implizite Kontrakte | Implicit contracts | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel | Corporate objective | Vertrag | Contract | Führungskräfte | Managers | Provision | Commission payments |
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