Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms : evidence from the residency match
Year of publication: |
March 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Rees-Jones, Alex |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 108.2018, p. 317-330
|
Subject: | Deferred acceptance algorithm | Matching | Suboptimal behavior | Theorie | Theory | Algorithmus | Algorithm |
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