Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kerber, Manfred ; Rowat, Colin |
Publisher: |
Birmingham : Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Birmingham |
Subject: | cooperative game theory | stable sets | algorithm | core | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Core | Algorithmus | Algorithm |
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