Supervision and Effort in an Intertemporal Efficiency Wage Model: The Role of the Solow Condition

The Solow condition is examined in an intertemporal model that blends the shirking and the turnover models of efficiency wages with managerial supervision. It is shown that the Solow condition does not hold when shirking and turnover costs are considered. The Solow condition can be a possible outcome when managerial productivity offsets shirking and turnover costs.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Faria, João Ricardo
Publisher:	Canterbury : University of Kent, Department of Economics
Subject:	Betriebsklima \| Effizienzlohn \| Theorie \| Labour-Management Relations \| Efficiency Wages \| Unemployment \| Turnover

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Series:	Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; 9814
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	86709057X [GVK] hdl:10419/105521 [Handle] RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:9814 [RePEc]
Classification:	J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010443316