Supply and Demand for Discrimination : Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game

Anthony Heyes, John A. List

There is a large and diverse body of evidence that people condition their behavior on the characteristics of others. If type is visible then one agent seeing another with whom they are interacting, or observing some other close proxy for type, can affect outcomes. We explore the economics of revealing type in a simple laboratory experiment to learn about the underlying motivations for discrimination

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Year of publication:	February 2016
Authors:	Heyes, Anthony
Other Persons:	List, John A. (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Vertrauen \| Confidence \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Diskriminierung \| Discrimination \| Experiment \| Ethnische Gruppe \| Ethnic group \| Soziale Beziehungen \| Social relations

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w21953
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w21953 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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