Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns : the role of information disclosure
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Mukherjee, Arijit |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 39.2008, 2, p. 469-490
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Subject: | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Implizite Kontrakte | Implicit contracts | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
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