Symmetry-based compromise and the Nash solution to convex bargaining problems

A new axiom, symmetry-based compromise, is introduced to study solutions to convex bargaining problems. It is shown that any efficient solution that is also scale invariant and satisfies symmetry-based compromise must be Nash.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Xu, Yongsheng
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 3, p. 484-486
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Convex bargaining problems \| Symmetry-based compromise \| Efficiency \| Scale invariance \| Nash solution

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572187