Tacit Collusion in a Segmented and Capacity Constrained Informal Rural Credit Market.

To be able to describe informal rural credit markets, we apply the Brock and Scheinkman model of a price setting and capacity constrained oligopoly, where firms tacitly collude on monopoly pricing. We generalise the model to allow for third-degree price discrimination. The interval of aggregate lending capacity that supports a counter-intuitively increasing part of the equilibrium price-function is smaller than for the uniform price case.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Hatlebakk, M.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	DISCRIMINATION \| PRICES \| MARKET \| CREDIT

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	39 pages
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; O16 - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment ; Q14 - Agricultural Finance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647128