Targeting in adaptive networks

Timo Hiller

This paper studies optimal targeting policies, consisting of eliminating (preserving) a set of agents in a network and aimed at minimizing (maximizing) aggregate effort levels. Different from the existing literature, we allow the equilibrium network to adapt after a network intervention and consider targeting of multiple agents. A simple and tractable adjustment process is introduced. We find that allowing the network to adapt may overturn optimal targeting results for a fixed network and that congestion/competition effects are crucial to understanding differences between the two settings.

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Year of publication:	[2020]
Authors:	Hiller, Timo
Publisher:	Rio de Janeiro, RJ : Departamento de Economia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro
Subject:	Targeting \| key player policy \| peer effects \| local strategic complements \| global strategic substitutes \| positive externalities \| negative externalities \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Soziale Gruppe \| Social group \| Soziales Netzwerk \| Social network