In this paper, the author draws up the historic background to the present systems for taxing income from capital. The old schedular taxes gave way for synthetic, global income taxes, but recent developments have gone in the opposite direction. Income from capital is now often taxed separately from other income, giving rise to new problems of legal classification. At the international level the first issue is whether the source country or the country of residence should have the right to tax. There are pros and cons for both sides, and a general attitude of horror vacui in the sense that double exemption is not regarded as an acceptable result. In this context, the question of tax competition is dealt with. The paper takes the position that whereas tax competition may be useful to bring down excessive tax rates, there is no benefit in a race to the bottom. The paper points out that tax competition is harmful if it implies that a small tax haven country attracts what is an important revenue source in a country with normal taxes and makes money out of a nominal registration fee. This is likened to thieves stealing precious jewellery only to melt it down and cash in the metal value. The proposed EU interest directive is discussed and doubts are expressed with respect to the chances of reaching agreement with low-tax countries and territories outside the EU. Other problems with a reporting system are the definition of interest for tax purposes as well as a common taxpayer identification number (TIN) system.
