Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy

Paul Heidhues; Nicolas Melissas

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Heidhues, Paul ; Melissas, Nicolas
Publisher:	Mannheim [u. a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	Information Externality \| Strategic Waiting \| Delay \| Information Cascade \| Investment Boom \| Optimal Taxation \| Innovationswettbewerb \| Technology competition \| Informationsverbreitung \| Information dissemination \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Betriebliche Investitionstheorie \| Corporate investment theory \| Optimale Besteuerung \| Optimal taxation

freely available

Full text |

More access options

nbn-resolving.de

www.sfbtr15.de

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	Online-Ressource (S. 44) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 306
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/94040 [Handle]
Classification:	D62 - Externalities ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935694