Temporary Workers Are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more selfish and contribute less than temporary and permanent workers.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Dragone, Davide ; Galeotti, Fabio ; Orsini, Raimondello
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 915
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3902 [DOI] 898806267 [GVK] hdl:10419/159754 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:WP915 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C93 - Field Experiments ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; H41 - Public Goods ; J54 - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651807