Test design under falsification
Year of publication: |
03 January 2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Skreta, Basilikē ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | information design | Falsification | Tests | manipulation | Cheating | Bayesian persuasion | Manipulation | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Betrug | Fraud | Statistischer Test | Statistical test | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Informationswert | Information value | Experiment | Produkttest | Product testing | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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