Testing for asymmetric information in reinsurance markets
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Yan, Zhiqiang ; Hong, Liang |
Published in: |
The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice : an official journal of the Geneva Association. - Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 1018-5895, ZDB-ID 196109-3. - Vol. 40.2015, 1, p. 29-46
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Subject: | asymmetric information | adverse selection | moral hazard | reinsurance markets | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Rückversicherung | Reinsurance | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Schätzung | Estimation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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