Testing limits to policy reversal: Evidence from Indian privatizations
We examine the effect of regime change on privatization. In the 2004 Indian election, the pro-reform BJP was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Stock prices of government-controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the BJP dropped 3.5% relative to private firms. Government-controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7.5% relative to private firms. This is consistent with investor belief of a "point of no return," where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse. Further analysis suggests that layoffs, combined with the privatization announcement, served as a credible commitment to privatize.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Dastidar, Siddhartha G. ; Fisman, Raymond ; Khanna, Tarun |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X. - Vol. 89.2008, 3, p. 513-526
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Government commitment Layoffs Emerging markets Electoral turnover Government policy credibility |
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