The Braess Paradox and coordination failure in directed networks with mixed externalities
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mak, Vincent ; Seale, Darryl A. ; Gisches, Eyran J. ; Yang, Rui ; Cheng, Meng ; Moon, Myounghee ; Rapoport, Amnon |
Published in: |
Production and operations management : the flagship research journal of the Production and Operations Management Society. - London : Sage Publications, ISSN 1937-5956, ZDB-ID 2151364-8. - Vol. 27.2018, 4, p. 717-733
|
Subject: | Braess Paradox | transportation networks | positive and negative network externalities | choice observability | coordination | experiments | behavioral operations | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Netzwerkökonomik | Network economics | Koordination | Coordination | Netzwerk | Network | Experiment | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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