The case against lawyers' contingent fees and the misapplication of principal-agent models
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Sacconi, Lorenzo |
Published in: |
European journal of law and economics. - New York, NY : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 0929-1261, ZDB-ID 1231592-8. - Vol. 32.2011, 2, p. 263-292
|
Subject: | Rechtsberatung | Legal services | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Theorie | Theory |
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