The Causal Effect of Option Pay on Corporate Risk Management

This study provides strong evidence of a causal effect of risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation on corporate risk management. We utilize the passage of FAS 123R, which required firms to expense options, to investigate how CEO option compensation affects the hedging behavior of oil and gas firms. Firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R significantly reduced option pay, which resulted in a large increase in their hedging intensity compared to firms that did not use options or expensed their options voluntarily prior to FAS 123R

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Bakke, Tor-Erik
Other Persons:	Mahmudi, Hamed (contributor) ; Fernando, Chitru S. (contributor) ; Salas, Jesus M. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Risikomanagement \| Risk management \| Hedging \| Aktienoption \| Stock option \| Welt \| World \| Gaswirtschaft \| Gas industry \| Erdölindustrie \| Oil industry

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