The consequences of hiring lower-wage workers in an incomplete-contract environment
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Brown, Jason L. ; Martin, Patrick R. ; Moser, Donald V. ; Weber, Roberto A. |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 90.2015, 3, p. 941-966
|
Subject: | incomplete contracts | gift exchange | employee effort | employee incentives | experimental markets | labor markets | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Experiment | Anreiz | Incentives | Personalbeschaffung | Recruitment | Arbeitskräfte | Workforce | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Arbeitsmarkt | Labour market | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsbeziehungen | Employment relations |
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