The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory

We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Dufwenberg, M. ; Norde, H. ; Reijnierse, H. ; Tijs, S.
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet
Subject:	GAME THEORY

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Series:	Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	18 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634524