The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory

We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Dufwenberg, Martin ; Norde, Henk ; Reijnierse, Hans ; Tijs, Stef
Published in:	Computational Statistics. - Springer. - Vol. 54.2001, 1, p. 119-131
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Consistency \| set-valued solution \| normative game theory \| self-enforcing recommendation

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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