The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps

This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2002-02-04
Authors:	Kóczy, László Á.
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	dynamic cooperative game \| indirect dominance \| core

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: 1 - included. Work in progress, comments welcome! 8 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407616